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In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm by 
the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract.  This contract specifies the duties of the firm 
and a financial compensation.  When it expires, a new contract is awarded, possibly to a 
different operator.  Cost-plus and fixed-price (gross cost or net cost) contracts are commonly 
used  to  regulate  the  operators  in  the  transport  industry.    In  this  paper,  we  analyse  the 
incentives for the operator to reduce its cost.  These incentives come from both the profit 
maximization during the current contract and the perspective of contract renewal.  In our 
model,  the  amount  of  cost-reducing  effort  depends  on  the  contract  type  and  the  time 
remaining till contract expiration.  We use a sample of 124 French urban public transport 
networks  covering  the  period  1995-2002  to  test  our  predictions.    Our  proxy  for  the  cost 
reducing effort is technical efficiency.   The data largely confirm the importance of contract 
type on performances and the incentive effect of contract renewal.   
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Cost-plus and fixed-price contracts are commonly used to regulate firms in utilities industries.  
In a cost-plus contract, the regulator reimburses all costs and pays, in addition, a specified 
profit  rate.    In  a  fixed-price  contract,  the  regulator  transfers  to  the  firm  a  fixed  payment 
independently of its realized cost.  The incentive regulation literature establishes that fixed-
price contracts give more incentives to reduce costs than cost-plus contracts (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1986, 1993).  In these models, the firm’s cost depends on an exogenous technological 
parameter, specific to the firm, and on the post-contractual effort exerted by the contractor.  
Only the realized cost is observable and, therefore, the effort cannot be contracted upon.  In a 
cost plus contract the firm’s profit is independent of its realized cost.  Hence, the firm has no 
incentive  to  engage  in  a  costly  post-contractual  effort.    By  contrast,  under  a  fixed-price 
contract, any cost increase or decrease amounts to a change in the firm’s profit.  The firm has 
then a lot of incentives to perform effort.  Precisely, a firm regulated by a fixed-price contract 
chooses the efficient amount of effort i.e. the effort that minimizes the total cost.  For this 
reason,  the  fixed-price  contract  is  a  high-powered  incentive  scheme,  while  the  cost-plus 
contract  is  a  low-powered  incentive  scheme.
1    Empirical  evidence  confirms  that  firms 
operating under a fixed-price contract are more efficient than firms operating under a cost 
plus contract (Mathias & Roger 1989, Gagnepain & Ivaldi 2002, Aubert & Reynaud 2005).  
But performance may not be the only criterion that determines the choice of a contractual 
form.    For  Bajari  and  Tadelis  (2001),  a  cost  plus  contract  allows  more  adaptation  to 
unforeseen contingencies and despite providing less incentive, it may be optimally chosen in 
uncertain environments. 
 
In this paper, we compare the incentives provided by cost plus and fixed-price contracts in a 
dynamic  framework.    We  consider  an  industry  where  the  regulator  and  the  firm  sign  a 
contract that lasts for several periods and at each period the firm has an opportunity to engage 
in  a  cost  reducing  effort.    Industries  like  water  supply,  waste  collection  or  urban 
transportation, where public authorities delegate the provision of the service to operators, 
                                                 
1 Yet, despite providing more incentives, a fixed-price contract may not be the regulator’s preferred option.  
Thus for instance, as shown by Laffont and Tirole (1986), when information is asymmetric, the optimal contract 
is neither a cost-plus nor a fixed-price contract but a menu of linear contracts where, in addition to a fixed 
payment, a fraction of the cost is reimbursed.   3 
 
share  this  feature.    Our  model  studies  the  optimal  allocation  of  effort  during  the  whole 
contracting  period.    We  first  confirm  that  fixed-price  contracts  provide  more  incentives.  
Moreover we show that under a fixed-price contract effort decreases with time to expiration.  
To understand, consider an effort that reduces the operating cost by a given amount e.  This 
effort has an undiscounted benefit (the cost saving for the remaining periods) of e(T-t) where 
t, is the time at which effort is exerted and T, the date of contract expiration.  Clearly, the 
marginal benefit of effort decreases during the contracting period (with t).  Hence, in a fixed-
price contract, the amount of effort decreases over time till the expiration date.   
The contribution of the paper is not only to assess the optimal effort path but also to consider 
contract renewal as an incentive device.  In a second step, we indeed incorporate in the model 
the  possibility  for  firms  to  be  renewed,  consistently  with  what  happens  in  most  utilities 
industries  where  regulators  periodically  organize  calls  for  tender.    We  show  that  the 
probability of being renewed impacts positively on effort, which confirms the incentive effect 
of competitive tendering.
2  The magnitude of this effect depends on the sensitivity of the 
probability of being renewed with respect to the operator’s performance.  Moreover, when the 
decision  to  renew  or  not  a  contract  is  based  only  on  the  relative  performance  of  the 
incumbent’s operator at the last period, operators have more incentives to exert effort when 
the contract renewal date approaches.  The reason is simple, a given effort costs less when it 
is exerted later on because future profit flows are discounted.   
To summarize, we identify two sources of incentives to undertake a costly cost-reducing 
effort: profits from the current contract and profit from a future renewed contract.  Incentives 
coming from the current contract profit maximization only operate if the contract is a fixed-
price  contract.    Moreover,  they  are  stronger  at  the  beginning  of  the  contracting  period.  
Incentives coming from contract renewal apply to both types of contract and they are greater 
when the contract approaches to its end.  Then, for cost-plus contract, effort should decrease 
with time to expiration.  For the fixed-price contract, effort can increase, decrease or be U-
shaped with the remaining time till contract expiration depending on the relative importance 
of the two types of incentives.   
                                                 
2 Like cost plus contract, sharecropping agreements have long been pointed for not providing enough incentives 
to perform effort.  Indeed, in a sharecropping contract, the farmer does not capture the full marginal benefit of 
his labor and therefore he may undersupplies effort.  However, Cheung (1969) shows that effort under provision 
may not be an issue in sharecropping since the landowner and the tenant have the choice of whether or not to 
renew the relation each year. The opportunity to continue the relationship is part of the incentive package offered 
to the farmer.  Likewise, in the utility sector, contract renewal may act as an incentive device.   
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An  additional  contribution  of  our  paper  is  to  use  a  more  sophisticated  classification  of 
contractual  practices  that  better  corresponds  to  the  variety  of  arrangements  observed  in 
utilities industries.  Indeed, in these sectors, there are two types of commonly used fixed-price 
contracts: gross cost and net cost contracts.   In a net cost contract, the operator has two 
sources of income, the commercial receipts from the service and a fixed transfer from the 
regulator.  In a gross cost contract, commercial receipts are collected by the regulator.  Hence, 
for a public transport operator regulated by a net cost contract, any change in the traffic 
volume affects the operator's profit.  And, since in the French public transport sector prices 
are regulated, traffic losses cannot be recovered by a tariff increase.  By contrast, in a gross 
cost contract, the operator's sole source of income is the transfer which is independent of 
changes in commercial receipts.     
 
In this paper, we argue that those firms that are regulated by a gross cost contract exert more 
effort than firms regulated by a net cost contract.  Indeed, firms operating under a net cost 
contract have two possibilities to increase their profit: they can exert a productive effort to 
decrease their operating cost and they can perform a commercial effort to increase the number 
of journeys on their network, and thereby their income.  On the other hand, firms operating 
under a gross cost contract do not increase their profit when traffic increases.  Hence, we 
conjecture that gross cost contracts will outperform net cost contracts in terms of productive 
effort  when  commercial  and  productive  efforts  are  substitutes,  that  is  when  either  the 
commercial  effort  increases  at  the  margin  the  cost  of  productive  effort  or  commercial 
performance reduces at the margin the sensitivity of the renewal decision with respect to 
operating cost.  In both cases, net cost contract operators will perform more commercial effort 
then gross cost contract operators and thereby less productive effort.   
 
To  test  these  predictions,  we  use  an  original  panel  data  set  covering  124  French  urban 
transport  networks  over  the  period  1995-2002.    The  French  urban  transport  sector  is  of 
particular  interest  because  local  regulators  that  delegate  the  operation  of  urban  transport 
services to private operators can choose to regulate them under fixed-price (gross cost or net 
cost contracts) or cost plus contracts.  In addition, local regulators are legally obliged to 
periodically launch calls for tender (usually every 6 years).  These characteristics allow us to 
compare the performance of firms operating under fixed-price and cost plus contracts and to 
assess the role of contract renewal as an incentive device.  5 
 
Using  the  stochastic  production  frontier  methodology  for  panel  data  (Battese  and  Coelli 
1995), we estimate the impact of contractual choice and time to expiration on operators’ 
technical  efficiency,  our  proxy  for  unobservable  productive  effort.    The  results  of  our 
estimations support the conjecture that firms operating under fixed-price contracts are more 
efficient  than  those  operating  under  cost  plus,  consistently  with  the  results  obtained  by 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) or Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007).  Moreover, we observe that 
firms operating under a gross cost contract have the highest technical efficiency.  Our results 
also reveal that time to expiration has a positive impact on efficiency for firms operating 
under  fixed-price  contracts,  i.e.  these  firms  exert  more  effort  at  the  beginning  of  the 
contracting period.  On the contrary, according to our estimations, time to expiration does not 
appear as a significant determinant of the level of effort exerted by firms under cost plus 
contracts and we do not observe that firms operating under a cost-plus contract exert more 
effort when the expiration date approaches.  Finally, we compare the efficiency of private and 
semi-private firms, the latter corresponding to hybrid organizational forms where the threat of 
termination is lower.  We show that semi-private firms have a lower efficiency level than 
private ones, whether they operate under cost plus or fixed-price contracts.  This confirms that 
contract renewal is indeed an incentive device although the lack of competition in the French 
UPT sector may limit the importance of its effect.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our model of dynamic regulation and 
the propositions we intend to test.  Section 2 presents the French urban public transport sector.  
Section  3  presents  our  methodology  and  data.    Section  4  provides  the  results  of  our 
estimations. 
 
1. The model   
A. A simple dynamic model of regulation  
 
We  consider  a  regulated  utility  sector  where  the  production  of  the  utility  good/service  is 
delegated by a regulator to a private firm.   The selected firm is chosen by the regulator after a 
competitive process.   
We construct a continuous time model.  At time t=0, the regulator and the firm sign a contract 
that lasts until time T.  The contract stipulates the duties of the contractor and compensation 
scheme.  We first consider two possible contracts: (1) a cost-plus contract where the regulator 6 
 
pays at each time t, the contractor’s cost   increased by a given amount   and (2) a 
fixed-price contract where the regulator transfers   to the firm at each time t irrespective of 
its realized cost  .  In our model, the contract type is exogenously given.   
At time t=0, the firm has an initial cost  .  At each subsequent time t, the cost   of the 
contractor is observable.
3  However, in line with the incentive regulation literature (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993), we assume that by exerting an unobservable effort   at time t, the firm 
reduces its cost by an amount  .  That is  where   is the time derivative of  .  
Hence, we have  .  
Effort is costly: when the firm exerts an effort  , it incurs a cost  .  The function 
 satisfies the following properties:  ,   ,  ,  . There is no 
uncertainty in our model and, therefore, effort can be perfectly inferred from the observed 
cost.  Hence, in principle, the firm can be perfectly compensated for its effort but this requires 
a more sophisticated contract than the fixed-price and cost-plus contracts we consider.  
At each time t, the contractor realizes a profit equal to: 
 
Profits are discounted at rate  .  The total discounted profit that the firm obtains from the 
contract is .  The firm accepts the initial contract if its total profit is at least equal 
to its outside opportunity.   
We will first discuss the incentives to exert effort that come from profit maximization.  In the 
next section, we will discuss the joint effect of profit maximization and contract renewal 
(which corresponds to the maximization of the expected profit from the renewed contract).   
Absent the possibility of contract renewal, the objective of the contracting firm is to maximize 
the sum of its total expected discounted profit flow.  A firm operating under a fixed-price 
contract faces the following problem:   
 subject to  , and T given 
In other words, the firm must find the optimal effort path   that maximizes its discounted 
profit flow.   The associated Hamiltonian function is:  
 
                                                 
3 Cost observability is a necessary condition for implementing a cost-plus contract.   7 
 
The first order conditions read as follow:  
  (1)     
  (2)     
  (3)     
  (4)     
Combining (3) and (4), we have .  Hence, the optimal effort path 
for a firm operating under a fixed-price contract is (we use a hat to denote optimal values):  
 
A firm operating under a cost-plus contract faces the following problem:   
 subject to  , and T given 
The solution is immediate:  .   
The results of our analysis can be summarized in the following propositions.   
Proposition 1:  For all t<T,  . 
Proposition 2:   .   
Proposition 1 is standard.  It confirms that firms under a cost-plus contract have no incentives 
to exert effort while a fixed-price contract provides incentives for effort (Laffont & Tirole 
1993, Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).  
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal effort path under fixed-price contracts decreases over 
time.  This is due to the fact that marginal benefits of effort are decreasing over time so that, 
to  maximize  their  profit  flow,  operators  regulated  by  fixed-price  contracts  have  more 
incentive to exert effort earlier.  A given effort exerted at time t increases the profit from the 
current period to the expiration date while the cost is only incurred once.  Therefore, the firm 
exerts more effort at the beginning of the contract than when its end approaches.      
 
B. Contract renewal as an incentive device 
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In the utility sector, the continuity of the service is an important determinant of its quality.  
Therefore, at the expiration of the initial contract (at time T), the regulator awards a new 
contract  for  the  period  going  from  T  to  T+ΔT.
4    Regulators  in  utility  sector  periodically 
organize call for tender to attribute fixed-term contracts.   
Importantly, the incumbent firm often participates in the competitive process leading to the 
attribution of the new contract.   Therefore, the perspective of contract renewal might be an 
important source of incentive for the incumbent firm.   
The role of contract renewal as an incentive device has long been recognized in the incentive 
regulation literature.  Laffont and Tirole (1993) consider that the breakout rule (the choice of 
renewing or not a firm as a function of its realized cost at the end of the initial contract) is part 
of the regulatory contract.  In this case, the regulator may bias the contract renewal to favour 
the incumbent or the entrant in order to provide more incentives.
5  And such a bias proves to 
be optimal under asymmetric information. In this paper, unlike Laffont and Tirole, we do not 
explicitly model the process of contract renewal.  Rather, we assume that, everything else 
being equal, a more efficient operator has a higher probability of being renewed, a property 
that holds in Laffont and Tirole’s models.  In the French urban transport sector, the authority 
cannot contract on the renewal procedure since it is stipulated by the law.  However, contract 
attribution being based on the principle of ‘intuitu personae’, we cannot exclude that some 
authorities might be biased in favour of one party, presumably the incumbent firm.  We will 
discuss the consequence of that when we detail our results.   
We will assume that the incumbent firm has a probability of being renewed which negatively 
depends on its realized cost at the end of the initial contract  .  Let us denote by  , 
the probability of contract renewal for the incumbent when it achieves a cost  at time T.  
We  assume  that  the  function    is  continuous  and  differentiable  and  that 
.    That  is,  a  firm  with  a  lower  cost  has  a  higher  probability  of  being 
renewed.        
For example, suppose that the incumbent firm competes for the contract with N other firms.  
Each  competitor  i=1,…,N  is  characterized  by  a  cost  of  providing  the  service  .    The 
                                                 
4 Note that this new contract may differ from the initial one in many respects (length, type of compensation, 
duties of the firm…).   
5 Similarly, Dalen et al. (2006) analyze a mechanism in which firms are ordered on the basis of the observed 
quality they provide and the firms that are relatively more successful are renewed, the others are not.   9 
 
regulator observes the cost   as well as the incumbent cost   and selects the lowest cost 
provider.    If  the  costs    are  independently  drawn  from  a  common  distribution  function 
,  the  probability  of  being  renewed  with  a  cost    is  equal  to 
, where  is the cumulative distribution function associated with 
.  In this case,  .      
If  the  contract  of  the  incumbent  firm  is  renewed  for  a  period  ΔT,  the  firm  collects  an 
additional profit flow.  This profit must be at least equal to the firm outside opportunity.  In 
the sequel, we will consider that the discounted profit flow for the incumbent coming from the 
renewed contract, denoted by  ,  is independent of the contract type and of the realized cost 
.  This, indeed, would be the case if the regulator observes the firm’s cost.
6  
When  the  possibility  of  contract  renewal  is  taken  into  account,  the  firm  maximizes  a 
(unweighted) sum of its current and expected future profit flows.  That is the firm solves the 
following problem:    
 subject to  , and T given. 
In the case of a fixed-price contract, the first order condition (4) of the above maximization 
problem must be replaced by:  
  (5)   
Combining (3) and (5), we have  .  Hence, the optimal effort 
path is:  
 
In the case of a cost-plus contract, the first order conditions of the maximization problem are 
(1), (2), (5) and  
  (6)    
Combining (5) and (6), we have  .  Hence, the optimal effort path is :  
 
                                                 
6 If, in the case the contract is renewed, more efficient firms have a lower profit flow, by exerting effort the 
operator increases its probability of contract renewal but it decreases the profit coming from contract renewal.   
Therefore, incentives coming from contract renewal are lower (a kind of ratchet effect).   10 
 
The results of our analysis can be summarized in the following propositions.   
Proposition  3:  Considering  the  possibility  of  contract  renewal,  for  all  t<T,  (i) 
, (ii)   and (iii)  .    
Proposition 4 :  .  
Proposition 3 establishes that, when contract renewal is taken into account, the level of effort 
exerted  by  operators  increases.    The  possibility  of  contract  renewal  thus  appears  as  an 
incentive device.  The magnitude of this effect depends on the sensitivity of the probability of 
contract renewal with respect to the realized cost at the end of the contracting period.  And, 
for  a  firm  operating  under  a  fixed-price  contract,  this  incentive  effect  reinforces  the  one 
coming from profit maximization.   
Proposition 4 shows that there is more effort exerted in a cost-plus contract as the end of the 
contract approaches.  In other words, when taking into account contract renewal, the optimal 
effort path under cost-plus contracts increases over time.  The reason is that only the total 
amount of effort together with the initial cost   matters for contract renewal.  Hence firms 
exert more effort when it is cheaper, that is at the end of the contract.
7 
The  impact  of  time  to  expiration  on  effort  path  is  ambiguous  in  the  case  of  fixed-price 
contract.  On the one hand, incentives coming from the maximization of the profit flow calls 
for a decrease in   (Proposition 2).  On the other hand, incentive for contract renewal calls 
for an increase in  .   Hence, the combined effect might be increasing, decreasing or U-
shaped.   
                                                 
7 The result of proposition 4 would be affected if we introduce uncertainty in our model.  If 
the cost has a stochastic component, effort would depend on the realized cost at each time t 
and the remaining time till contract expiration.   In this case, the monotonicity of effort would 
not be guaranteed. 11 
 
C.  Gross cost and net cost contracts 
In our analysis, we considered that the only source of income for the operator is the transfer 
paid by the regulator.   This means that the receipts from the service are actually collected by 
the regulator.  This is indeed the case for two contract types widely used in the utility sector, 
the cost-plus and the gross cost contracts.  There is however a third popular contract type: the 
net  cost  contract,  where  the  operator  receives  a  fixed  payment  and  collects  the  service 
revenues.  Hence, the total income at period t for an operator regulated by a net cost contract 
is   where   is the transfer,   is the price and   is the quantity sold.   In the 
utility sectors, prices are often regulated and specified in the contract.  Hence, the only way to 
increase the sales proceeds is to increase the quantity sold.  We will consider that the demand 
for a service depends on its price, its quality and the commercial effort performed to promote 
the service.  In the field of urban transport, this commercial effort includes all the initiatives to 
encourage the use public transport (e.g. information to potential customers, mobility plans, 
advertisement, provision of intermodal facilities). 
We therefore distinguish productive and commercial efforts.   Productive effort   aims at 
reducing  the  cost,  commercial  effort    aims  at  increasing  the  quantity  sold.    More 
specifically we assume that   and   with  .  The cost of effort is 
then  .  This function is increasing and convex in its two arguments.    
In a competitive bidding for a fixed-price contract, the contract is awarded to the firm who 
ask for the lowest amount of subsidy.  In the case of a gross cost contract, the lowest bidder is 
likely to be the firm with the lowest cost.  In the case of a net cost contract, the lowest bidder 
is likely to be the firm that could achieve the lowest operating deficit
8 (= ≥0).  
And, since a cost reduction of 1 euro has the same impact on the operating losses than an 
increase of 1 euro in the commercial receipts, the probability of contract renewal could be 
expressed as   with  .    
Suppose that the function  is the same whatever the type of fixed-price contract 
(gross cost or net cost contract).  The operator will exert more productive effort in the gross 
                                                 
8 In the French urban transport, the commercial receipts account for less than half of the total costs.   12 
 
cost  case  under  the  following  assumptions:  (A1)    and  (A2) 
.   
Assumption A1 means that productive and commercial efforts are substitutes.  This recovers 
the idea that managerial resources are scarce and, therefore, more effort in one task makes, at 
the margin, effort more costly in the other.  Assumption A2 states that the renewal probability 
is concave in the operator’s own performance.  The impact of effort on the probability of 
being renewed decreases with the operator’s performance.  Under assumptions A1 and A2, 
we can establish the following result (the proof is in the appendix). 
Proposition 5: Firms operating under a gross cost contract exerts more productive effort than 
firms operating under a net cost contract.    
According  to  proposition  5,  a  net  cost  contract  provides  less  incentives  for  productive 
efficiency  than  a  gross  cost  contract  because  commercial  effort  partially  crowds  out 
productive effort.   More effort (in general) is more and more costly and its benefit in terms of 
renewal probability decreases.  Hence, operators invest less productive effort because they do 
invest more in commercial effort.  Indeed, the lower productive efficiency induced by the net 
cost contract is compensated by a higher level of commercial effort. Firms operating under a 
gross cost contract have no incentives to undertake commercial effort (unless the contract 
renewal  decision  is  based  on  cost  and  traffic  levels)  while,  under  a  net  cost  contract, 
commercial  effort  increases  both  the  profit  and  the  probability  of  continuing  operations.  
Hence,  net  cost  contracts  induce  a  lower  productive  efficiency  but  a  higher  commercial 
efficiency.  However, in our data, we are only able to test the first effect.      
 
2. The French urban public transport sector  
To  test  our  propositions  on  the  impact  of  regulatory  schemes  and  time  to  contractual 
expiration on effort, we focus on the French urban public transport sector.  With regard to the 
issue we are interested in, this case is a particularly rich domain since, in France, the local 
authorities in charge of regulating the procurement of urban public transport services can 
choose between various organizational modes.   13 
 
First, they may choose between direct provision and outsourcing.  In the former option, urban 
transport services are provided in-house by a public administration.  In the latter case, service 
provision  is  delegated  to  external  contractors  that  can  be  either  a  semi-public  firm
9  or  a 
private  company.    In  such  cases,  local  authorities  are  obliged  to  periodically  organize  a 
competitive tendering to select their provider (every 6 years in average).  Thus contracts 
cannot  be  automatically  renewed.    Figure  1  shows  the  distribution  of  these  modes  of 
organizations in 2002. 
 
Figure 1: Modes of organization of the French urban public transport in 2002- 




The second interesting feature of this sector is that various contractual schemes are used to 
regulate external operators.  Indeed, when service operation is delegated to a private or semi-
public  firm,  the  formal  contract  between  local  authorities  and  operators  may  be  of  three 
different types, depending on their degree of risk-sharing.  Operators may be regulated by 
cost-plus contracts (called management contract), characterized by the full recovery of budget 
losses by local authorities.  Under such scheme, operators bear neither industrial risk (on cost) 
nor commercial risk (on commercial revenues).  A second type of regulatory schemes is gross 
cost contracts, where industrial risk is taken by the operator while commercial risk is borne by 
the local authority.  At last, regulatory schemes in the French urban public transport sector 
may also take the form of net cost contracts, where both the industrial and the commercial 
risks are borne by the operator.  This typology therefore echoes the traditional distinction 
                                                 
9 In this case, the majority of the capital stock (at least 51% and at most 82%) is under public control. 
10 Source: our database of 165 local authorities out of a total of 241 existing local authorities in France. This 
dataset is described later on in the paper. 14 
 
between cost-plus and fixed-price contracts since the two last types of contracts (gross cost 
and net cost contracts) are variants of fixed-price contracts.  Figure 2 reports the share of each 
contractual type in 2002
11.   
 
Figure 2 : Modes of delegation of the French urban public transport in 2002 
(in % of the number of networks)
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As already mentioned, under the French legal framework of the urban transport sector, the use 
of competitive tendering to select the service provider is compulsory and automatic renewal 
of contracts is forbidden.  However, as emphasized by Yvrande-Billon (2006) and Amaral et 
al. (2008), this does not mean that competition for the market is intense.  As illustrated in 
figure 3, the French urban public transport market is characterized by few bidders (1.6 in 
average over the period 1995-2002 which is the one we concentrate on) and a high proportion 
of  tenders  with  only  one  bidder  (50%  in  average).    Additionally,  out  of  the  99  bidding 
procedures we were able to record over the period 1995-2002, 87 % (85) have led to the 
renewal of the incumbent.  Interestingly, we also observe that, when the incumbent is a semi-
public company, he is renewed in 95.45% of the cases
13, whereas a private incumbent has a 
probability of 83.12% of being renewed
14. 
 
                                                 
11  As  indicated  on  the  figure,  a  fourth  type  of  contract  (concession  contracts)  is  used  to  regulate  private 
operators.  With this type of regulatory scheme, operators bear the industrial and commercial risks, as in net cost 
contracts, but they are also in charge of the investments in dedicated infrastructure, equipment and rolling stock.  
This type of contract is therefore associated with longer duration but is rarely used in the French context.   
12 Source: our database of 165 local authorities. 
13 Out of the 22 auctions with a semi-public incumbent, only 1 translated into a change of operator. 
14 Out of the 77 auctions with a private incumbent, 13 translated into a change of operator. 15 
 
Figure 3 : Number of bidders in France 
 
Source: CERTU 1997, 1999, 2001, GART 2005 and authors’ own calculation 
 
These results need to be interpreted carefully.  The decreasing and low number of bidders 
might obviously be related to the extent of the networks and to the resulting concentration of 
the  transport  industry.    The  market  is  dominated  by  three  large  companies  which  hold 
together more than 74% of the market shares in terms of numbers of networks.  The potential 
for competition is therefore limited de facto.  Furthermore, the rate of incumbents’ renewal is 
likely to be a very imperfect indicator of competitive pressure.  We can indeed consider that 
the  incumbents  have  renewed  most  of  their  contracts  by  placing  better  bids  than  their 
competitors.  In this sense, the high rate of incumbents’ renewal that we observe in France 
would not indicate that competition for the market does not exist.  However, given the very 
high proportion of calls for tender that received only one bid and considering that collusive 
practices  in  the  sector  were  recently  condemned  by  the  French  Competition  Commission 
(Conseil  de  la  Concurrence  2005),  one  can  decently  assert  that  the  French  urban  public 
transport  sector  is  characterized  by  a  low  level  of  competition.    In  addition,  the  lack  of 
transparency  of  the  selection  procedure  monitored  by  local  authorities  together  with  the 
magnitude of their discretionary power
15 make the French system prone to favouritism.  
With regard to our model, these characteristics of the French system of regulation in the urban 
public transport sector have an important implication.  The low level of competitive intensity 
and the potential for favouritism suggest that   might be relatively small, that is 
                                                 
15 See Yvrande-Billon (2006) for a detailed explanation of the procedure. 16 
 
to say that the probability of contract renewal might be relatively insensitive to the realized 
cost of the last period.  Moreover, consistently with our previous observations, one can expect 
P’ to be even smaller in the case of semi-public companies, which are partly managed by 
local authorities.  Indeed, for a semi-public company, the authority is both involved in the 
management of one potential bidder and responsible for allocating the contract.  In such a 
situation, rival firms might be deterred to make counter-offers and incumbent’s renewal is 
likely
16.   
 
3. Empirical methodology and data  
To test our propositions, we use technical efficiency as a proxy for unobservable effort, as it 
has been done in various empirical contributions to the new theory of regulation (Aubert and 
Reynaud (2005), Piacenza (2006), Margari et al. (2007)).  Technical efficiency refers to the 
degree to which service provision is maximised given the resources at hand
17.  In other words, 
technical inefficiency arises from an excessive use of inputs and its measurement involves a 
comparison between observed and optimal values of services (outputs) and resources (inputs).  
This  performance  indicator  is  intensively  used  in  the  empirical  literature  in  transport 
economics (De Borger et al. 2002).  Moreover as it is a measure of physical performance this 
indicator  less  suffers  from  problems  of  data  availability  and  reliability.    The  information 
required to measure technical efficiency are the service and resource quantities, which are 
very often available at the firm level and are, most of the time, more reliable than financial or 
monetary data (like profits or costs for instance).   
Several methods can be used to evaluate the technical efficiency of a given firm (Murillo-
Zamarano 2004).  Among the more common approaches
18, the one we use in this paper is the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).  This frontier method is not strictly preferable to the others.  
On the one hand, compared to the non-parametric methods, this method allows taking account 
of  random  errors.    On  the  other  hand,  its  main  disadvantage  is  that  it  assumes  that  the 
boundary of the production possibility set can be represented by a particular functional form 
                                                 
16 Such effects are highlighted by the local authorities: in recent interviews conducted by a trade organization 
(GART 2005), some of them declared that delegation to a semi-public company was a mode of organization that 
discourages potential entrants to submit bids.  
17 Depending on the circumstances, efficiency can also be measured from the opposite orientation, as the degree 
to which resource consumption is minimized to satisfy service demand. 
18 The three more common approaches are (1) parametric linear programming approach, (2) data envelopment 
analysis and (3) stochastic production frontier. For a description of these different approaches, see Coelli, Rao & 
Battese (1998) or Coelli, Estache, Perelman & Trujillo (2003). 17 
 
with constant parameters.  However, we consider that the fact that SFA imposes an explicit 
functional  form  and  distribution  assumption  on  data  is  less  of  an  issue  since  our  large 
database  allows  us  to  run  a  translog  function,  which  is  a  very  flexible  functional  form.  
Moreover,  as  our  objective  in  this  paper  is  not  only  to  estimate  a  frontier  and  collect 
inefficiency  scores  but  also  and  above  all  to  analyse  the  determinants  of  technical 
inefficiency, the more relevant method seems to be the stochastic frontier analysis and more 
precisely, the panel model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995).  
The stochastic production frontier
19 of firm i in time t is thus defined by: 
yit = f(xit, zit ; β) + vit - uit             (1) 
where yit represents the production level of the i-th firm at date t; xit is a vector of inputs of the 
i-th firm at date t; zit is a vector of environmental variables for the i-th firm at date time t;  is 
a vector of unknown parameter to be estimated.  The vit and uit are random variables.  More 
precisely, vit is the idiosyncratic error component of the stochastic part.  It corresponds to the 
usual  disturbance  introduced  in  regression  models,  and  therefore  represents  all  types  of 
omitted or unobservable variables that have unbounded effects on output (such as weather 
uncertainty  or  measurement  errors).    uit  is  the  technical  inefficiency  component  of  the 
stochastic part.  It is therefore supposed to be a non-negative valued random variable (uit 0) 
and it captures the technical and economic inefficiency under control of the operator. 
The vit are assumed to be iid N(0, v²) random errors, independently distributed of the uit.  The 
uit are assumed to be independently distributed as truncated normal N(witδ, u²), where wit is a 
vector of explanatory variables that affect technical inefficiency of firms over time and δ is a 
vector of unknown coefficients. 
The  parameters    and    are  estimated  simultaneously  with  the  method  of  maximum 
likelihood  and  the  likelihood  function  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  variance  parameters, 
    and    .    γ    measures  the  importance  of  the  variance  of 
production  inefficiency  relative  to  total  variance.    A  value  close  to  one  indicates  that 
productive inefficiency is important relative to the random noise term affecting production 
level (for a more detailed explanation of this method, see Kumbhakar & Knox Lovell, 2000). 
                                                 
19 The production frontier gives the maximum output that can be produced from a specified set of inputs, given 
the existing technology available or, put differently, the minimum resources employed for producing a certain 
level of output. 18 
 
A first advantage of the Battese and Coelli’s model is that it formulates a model for the 
technical  inefficiency  effects,  which  is  not  done  in  many  studies  estimating  stochastic 
production frontiers.  The second advantage is that it allows estimating simultaneously the 
parameters of the stochastic production frontier and the parameters of the inefficiency model.  
Therefore, this approach is statistically more relevant than the two-stage approach used in 
several  studies  which  consists  in  predicting  the  technical  inefficiency  effects  via  the 
estimation of a stochastic production frontier and then regressing the inefficiency measures 
obtained in the first stage on some explanatory variables.  Thus, in the first stage, inefficiency 
effects are assumed to be identically distributed whereas in the second stage these error terms 
are assumed to depend on some other variables.  The model developed by Battese and Coelli 
allows avoiding this inconsistency (Dalen & Gomez-Lobo, 2002).  
 
The database we use to confront our predictions and calculate technical efficiency assembles 
the  results  of  two  annual  surveys  conducted  by  an  agency  of  the  French  Ministry  of 
Transportation  on  the  one  hand  and  a  trade  organization  that  gathers  most  of  the  local 
authorities in charge of urban transport on the other hand.   The data are available between 
1995 and 2002 for a total of 165 networks (out of 241).  But, for a purpose of homogeneity 
we have excluded the cities with at least one mass transit system (subway and tramway) 
which have obviously a different production function.  We have also reduced our sample by 
excluding  the  smallest  cities  (under  30,000  inhabitants)  that  are  also  assumed  to  have  a 
different production function
20.  At last, as our propositions only deal with the performance 
differential of various delegation contracts, we have excluded from the original sample all the 
cities where service is provided by a public administration.  The result is an unbalanced panel 
of 802 yearly observations covering 124 different urban transport networks over eight recent 
years (from 1995 to 2002 included).  
 
Our output variable (yit) is the number of vehicle-kilometres produced by the i-th firm during 
year t.  The definition of output we retain is therefore supply-orientated, which is disputable 
(Berechman 1993).  Ignoring demand may indeed lead to consider that the most efficient 
operators are those whose buses are empty.  However, the main argument explaining our 
choice of a supply-orientated measure of output is that demand-related measures (such as 
                                                 
20 As a consequence of these selections, the few networks operated by a company regulated by a concession 
contract were excluded. 19 
 
passenger-trips)  are  not  so  much  under  the  control  of  operators  but  are  rather  extremely 
dependent  upon  exogenous  determinants  such  as  the  rates  of  unemployment  and  car 
ownership, which, furthermore, are unavailable at a disaggregated level in our database
21.  
Consequently, what we call technical efficiency in our empirical analysis is the operators’ 
technical capability to produce the maximum level of vehicle-kilometres given the underlying 
technology, i.e. given a specified set of inputs.   
The inputs we consider are the most frequently used in the literature, namely capital, labour 
and energy.  Capital (X
CAP) is measured by the number of vehicles (bus, trolleybus, minibus, 
etc…) used to provide the service.  We could not have enough reliable financial data to create 
another indicator of capital expenses.  However, although incomplete, our indicator takes into 
account the major part of capital, that is rolling stock.  Labour (X
LAB) is measured by the 
number  of  employees  including  temporary  work  and  subcontracting  personnel  with  no 
distinction between driving labour and non-driving labour.  The total number of employees is 
measured in equivalent full time and the quantity of labour in equivalent ‘employee-year’.  At 
last, energy (X
ENE) is measured in equivalent diesel m3.  
In  addition  to  these  input  variables,  we  introduce  various  control  variables  to  take  into 
account the characteristics of the networks and the quality of the rolling stock.  Thus we take 
the number of inhabitants per kilometre of bus line as a proxy for the density of population in 
the area served by public transport (Z
DENSITY).  The impact of this variable on the level of 
production is expected to be positive as the higher the population density the more vehicles-
kilometres supplied by the operators.  We also control for the average commercial speed of 
buses (Z
SPEED).  This variable partly captures the environmental characteristics of the network 
such as the presence of natural barriers or the existence of traffic congestion that are expected 
to  have  a  negative  impact  on  commercial  speed,  hence  a  negative  impact  on  technical 
efficiency.  At last, we use the average age of rolling stock to control for the differences in the 
quality of capital (Z
AGE).  We expect the level of production to be negatively related to the 
average age of the fleet.   
Finally, to test our central propositions regarding the impact of regulatory schemes and time 
to expiration on effort, we introduce the following variables in the inefficiency model.   
•  PRIVATE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the operator in a particular year is 
a private company and 0 otherwise (that is if the operator is a semi-public company); 
                                                 
21 For other arguments as to why the majority of technical efficiency studies in urban transit uses pure supply 
indicators, see Kerstens (1996). 20 
 
•  FP is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the operator is regulated by a fixed-price 
contract and 0 otherwise; 
•  CPLUS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the operator is regulated by a cost-
plus contract and 0 otherwise; 
•  GROSS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the operator is regulated by a gross 
cost contract and 0 otherwise; 
•  NET is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the operator is regulated by a net cost 
contract and 0 otherwise; 
•  EXPIRt measures at year t the number of remaining years before contract expiration; 
hence EXPIRit*GROSSit for instance gives at year t the number of remaining years 
before the gross cost contract of operator i expires. 
Descriptive statistics on our variables are provided in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics (124 networks, 8 periods) 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Vehicle-km (Y)  2,599,757  2,585,871  178,106  11,400,000 
Labour (X
LAB)  151.721  164.719  8  958.749 
Energy (X
ENE)  1,173.022  1,287.478  78  6,005.557 
Capital (X
CAP)  67.488  65.001  6  365 
Age (Z
AGE)  8.221  1.942  3.3  16.5 
Speed (Z
SPEED)  16.271  2.483  11.4  30 
Density (Z
DENSITY)  734.076  332.382  207.588  2,608.353 
Private  0.728  0.445  0  1 
FP  0.708  0.455  0  1 
Gross  0.278  0.448  0  1 
Net  0.430  0.495  0  1 
Expir*Cplus  1.066  2.006  0  11 
Expir*Gross  1.176  2.310  0  11.92 
Expir*Net  2.060  2.954  0  15 
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4. Empirical results  
To determine the inefficiency properties of the various regulatory schemes and of time to 
expiration, we estimate the following translogarithmic production frontier model
22:  
 
with the technical inefficiency effects uit assumed to be independently distributed as truncated 
normal    where  w={PRIVATE;  FP;  GROSS;  NET;  EXPIR*CPLUS; 
EXPIR*GROSS; EXPIR*NET} is a vector of firm specific variables that affect inefficiency 
across  firms  and    is  a  vector  of  unknown  coefficients.    The  various  combinations  of 
variables that were introduced in the vector w will be discussed below when the results are 
presented.   
Before displaying and interpreting the results of our estimations, it is worth mentioning the 
testable propositions that can be derived from our theoretical model.  We expect FP, GROSS 
and NET to have a positive impact on technical efficiency
23 as we conjecture that fixed-price 
contracts are more high-powered incentives contracts than cost-plus contracts (proposition 1).  
Additionally, according to proposition 5, we expect the variable GROSS to have a larger 
impact on technical efficiency than NET.  According to proposition 3, PRIVATE is expected 
to have a positive impact on efficiency.  Indeed, as we assume that the probability of contract 
renewal for semi-public operators is less sensitive to realized cost at the end of the contract, 
we expect private firms to perform better than semi-public operators.  From proposition 4, 
EXPIR*CPLUS  is  expected  to  impact  negatively  on  efficiency  since  we  conjecture  that 
operators under cost-plus regulatory schemes exert more effort at the end of the contracting 
period.  At last, the expected signs of the coefficients of EXPIR*GROSS and EXPIR*NET are 
a priori unknown.  Indeed, the theoretical model does not allow us to disentangle between the 
                                                 
22 In order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we omit the cross-products between the inputs X 
and the control variables Z. 
23 Note that our model is a technical inefficiency model so that, in the estimations, a negative sign means that the 
variable has a positive (negative) impact on efficiency (inefficiency).  For commodity reasons, in the formulation 
of  our  testable  propositions,  we  prefer  to  indicate  the  expected  impact  of  our  firm  specific  variables  on 
efficiency. 22 
 
opposite effects of these variables on effort.  On the one hand, incentives coming from profit 
maximization  call  for  a  positive  impact  of  EXPIR*GROSS  and  EXPIR*NET  on  technical 
efficiency (proposition 2): the further from contract expiration, the higher the level of effort 
exerted by operators under fixed-price contracts.  On the other hand, incentives coming from 
contract renewal call for a negative impact of these two variables on technical efficiency 
(proposition 4): the closer to the end of the contract, the higher the level of effort exerted by 
operators under fixed-price regulatory schemes.   23 
 
Table 2. Production frontier estimation results 
Parameter  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
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LL function  969.29  899.71  899.41  898.52  898.92 
LR test one 
sided errors 
195.49  56.31  55.01  53.93  54.05 
Nb of 
restrictions 
4  5  5  6  6 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1. t-ratios are in parentheses. 24 
 
To  facilitate  the  interpretation  of  the  estimated  first-order  parameters  in  the  translog 
production  functions,  we  calculated  the  production  elasticities  at  the  sample  means
24  and 
obtained the ratios presented in Table 3.  As expected, the estimated production elasticities of 
our input variables (labour, energy, rolling stock) are positive, meaning that an increase in 
transit inputs results in a larger output.  Furthermore, the obtained values are consistent with 
the results of other studies (Roy et al. 2007). 
 
Table 3. Production elasticities 
Production elasticity at the sample means  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Labour  0.090  0.109  0.105  0.113  0.105 
Energy  0.657  0.645  0.652  0.636  0.634 
Vehicles  0.201  0.200  0.192  0.195  0.198 
Return to scale  0.947  0.954  0.949  0.944  0.937 
 
Regarding the inefficiency models, it appears from model 1 that operators under fixed-price 
contracts are closer to the production frontier than operators under cost-plus contracts (δFP is 
negative).  However, the parameter γ, although statistically different from 0, is low (0.011).  If 
instead we split the variable FP into two categories (GROSS, NET) to take into account the 
existence of gross cost and net cost contracts, the quality of the estimation (models 2 and 3) 
largely improves (γ is equal to 0.544 and 0.507 respectively and is significantly different from 
0).    Both  results  therefore  support  our  proposition  1  which  conjectured  that  fixed-price 
contracts are superior regulatory schemes in term of technical efficiency.  Moreover, our 
proposition 5 is corroborated as the coefficient of GROSS is significantly larger in absolute 
value  than  the  coefficient  of  NET.    As  already  emphasized  by  Roy  and  Yvrande-Billon 
(2007), gross cost contracts appear to induce the higher levels of technical efficiency. 
The impact of contract renewal on effort is captured by the dummy variable PRIVATE which 
indicates whether the operator is a private company or a semi-public entity (the omitted case).  
In  all  models,  the  variable  PRIVATE  has  a  significant  positive  impact  on  efficiency  (the 
parameters δPRIVATE are all significantly different from zero at 1%).  Consistently with our 
proposition 3, private operators exhibit higher technical efficiency than semi-public firms.  
This might be due to the fact that private operators face more competition at the contract 
                                                 
24  For  instance,  labour  elasticity  is  calculated  at  the  sample  means  with  the  following  formula : 
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attribution stage than semi-public companies.  In such case, this would confirm that contract 
renewal is indeed an incentive device. 
Models 4 and 5 suggest that time to expiration has no consequence on the level of effort 
exerted  by  operators  under  cost-plus  contracts  since  the  coefficient  δEXPIR*CPLUS  is  not 
statistically  different  from  zero  (no  support  for  proposition  4).    On  the  contrary,  time  to 
expiration appears as a significant determinant of technical efficiency for operators under 
fixed-price contracts (whether gross or net cost contracts).  The coefficients δEXPIR*GROSS and 
δEXPIR*NET  are  negative  and  statistically  different  from  zero.    This  result  corroborates  our 
proposition 2: fixed-price contracts induce more incentives at the beginning of the contracting 
period.  Yet, the fact that δEXPIR*GROSS and δEXPIR*NET are low and that δEXPIR*CPLUS is not statistically 
significant may indicate that the impact of contract renewal on effort is limited.  Lack of 
competition in the French UPT sector may explain the low level of the coefficients associated 
with the variable linked to contract renewal.  But, except for the variable δEXPIR*CPLUS, all the 
variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant.  This confirms that contract 
renewal has a positive but limited impact on productive efficiency.    
 
5. Conclusions  
Incentive regulation theory has long recognized the role of contracting practices in explaining 
the performances of regulated firms.  In this paper, we particularly focus on the link between 
contract types and performances in a dynamic model of regulation where firms care about 
their current profits and their future profits coming from contract renewal.  We distinguish 
three types of regulatory contracts, net cost, gross cost and cost-plus contracts that are widely 
used in the utility sector.  We consider a firm regulated by one of these contracts and this firm 
has the possibility to undertake a cost-reduction effort.  The firm and the regulator have 
signed an initial contract that lasts for several periods and, when it expires, a new contract will 
be put to tender.  Firms have then the opportunity to have their contract renewed which 
obviously leads to higher profits.  The possibility of contract renewal is indeed a particular 
feature of the utility sectors where service continuity is often a must.  We study the incentives 
created by profit maximization and contract renewal for each contract type.  We are interested 
not  only  in  the  magnitude  of  the  incentive  effects  but  also  in  their  timing  during  the 
contracting period. 26 
 
Our predictions are confronted with a panel dataset of 124 regulatory contracts used in the 
French  urban  public  transport  sector  over  the  period  1995-2002.    We  adopt  a  stochastic 
production frontier methodology and use technical efficiency as a proxy for the level of effort 
exerted by operators.  Our conclusions can be summarized in three main points. 
First, we largely confirm that high powered incentive schemes are associated with higher 
performances.  Our focus in this paper is productive efficiency, and regarding this aspect, 
those operators who are responsible for the productive risk have a higher performance than 
those who are not.  But the observed relation between risk and performance is not a linear 
one.  Those operators who bear in addition the commercial risk have a lower productive 
efficiency.    Our  explanation  is  that  operators  under  a  net  cost  contract  can  exert  both 
productive and commercial effort to improve their financial performances, and, if the two are 
substitutes, they will exert less productive effort but more commercial effort.  In our data, we 
observe a lower technical efficiency for net cost contract operators compared to gross cost 
contracts operators that we interpret as a lower level of productive effort but, because we do 
not have appropriate data on commercial performances, we cannot test the second part of the 
proposition. 
Second, we analyze the allocation of effort during the whole contracting period.  We show 
that the incentives to exert effort vary with the remaining time till contract expiration.  A cost-
reducing effort not only increases the performances at the current period but also during the 
remaining years until contract expiration.  Therefore, the benefits of a cost-reducing effort are 
higher when it is exerted earlier.  The data confirm that, except for the operators regulated by 
a cost-plus contract, there is more effort at the beginning of the contracting period, this effect 
being stronger for gross cost contracts. 
Third, we consider the impact of contract renewal on the incentives to exert effort.  At the 
contract  expiration  date,  incumbent  operators  with  a  higher  performance,  have,  ceteris 
paribus, a higher probability of being reappointed and thereby collecting new profits.  In the 
French urban transport sector, competition is not fierce and the incentive effect coming from 
the  possibility  of  contract  renewal  is  therefore  limited.    Despite  that,  our  data  show  that 
competition for the market remains an important disciplining device and the incentives it 
creates differ from those coming from profit maximization. 
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6.1 Proof of proposition 5 
1.  The contract is a gross cost contract 
The profit of the firm is  and the firm’s objective writes as 
follow    subject  to  , and  T  given.    The 
solution to this problem is given by   and  . 
2. The contract is a net cost contract 
The profit of the firm is  and the firm’s objective 
writes as follow   subject to  ,  , 
,  and T given.   
To solve this optimisation program, we construct the associated Hamiltonian function: 
 
Taking the first order conditions, we obtain after manipulations: 
(1)   
(2)   
(3)   
(4)   
Combining (1) and (3), we have that under assumptions A1 and A2    if 
.   A sufficient condition for that is  .   In this case,  .   30 
 
6.2 Specification tests 
Table 4. Specification Tests  
Null hypothesis  Test 
Statistic 
Critical Value  Decision 
Model 1       
(1) No inefficiency effects 
H0:γ=δ0=δPRIVATE=δFP=0  195.49  χ²1%(4)=13.277  Reject H0 
(1’) No impact of incentive schemes and competition on 
efficiency 
H0:δPRIVATE=δFP=0 
195.26  χ²1%(2)=9.210  Reject H0 
Model 2       
(2) No inefficiency effects 
H0:γ=δ0=δPRIVATE=δGROSS=δNET=0  56.31  χ²1%(5)=15.086  Reject H0 
(2’) No impact of incentive schemes and competition on 
efficiency 
H0: δPRIVATE=δGROSS=δNET=0 
56.1  χ²1%(3)=11.341  Reject H0 
Model 3       
(3) No inefficiency effects 
H0:γ=δ0=δPRIVATE=δGROSS=δNET=0  55.01  χ²1%(5)=15.086  Reject H0 
(3’)No impact of incentive schemes and competition on 
efficiency 
H0: δPRIVATE=δGROSS=δNET=0 
55.5  χ²1%(3)=11.341  Reject H0 
Model 4       
(4) No inefficiency effects 
H0:γ=δ0=δPRIVATE=δEXPIR*CPLUS=δEXPIR*GROSS=δEXPIR*NET=0  53.93  χ²1%(6)=16.812  Reject H0 
(4’)No impact of incentive schemes and competition on 
efficiency 
H0:δPRIVATE=δEXPIR*CPLUS=δEXPIR*GROSS=δEXPIR*NET=0 
53.72  χ²1%(4)=13.277  Reject H0 
Model 5       
(5) No inefficiency effects 
H0:γ=δ0=δPRIVATE=δEXPIR*CPLUS=δEXPIR*GROSS=δEXPIR*NET=0  54.05  χ²1%(6)=16.812  Reject H0 
(5’)No impact of incentive schemes and competition on 
efficiency 
H0:δPRIVATE=δEXPIR*CPLUS=δEXPIR*GROSS=δEXPIR*NET=0 
54.52  χ²1%(4)=13.2770  Reject H0 
 
The  likelihood-ratio  test  statistic,  λ=-2{log[Likelihood(H0)]-log[Likelihood(H1)]},  has  approximately  chi-
square distribution with parameter equal to the number of parameters assumed to be zero in the null hypothesis, 
H0, provided H0 is true. 